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Abstract
This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT)
operating efficiencies. We estimate stochastic-frontier, panel-data models specifying a translog cost function. The specified model updates the cost frontier with
new information as it becomes available over time. The model can identify frontier cost improvements, returns to scale, and cost inefficiencies over time. The
results disagree with most previous research in that we find no evidence of scale
economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary
to previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G2, L25, L85
Keywords: Real Estate Investment Trusts, X-efficiency, scale economies

I.

Introduction

This paper examines frontier cost (technological) improvements, scale economies, and operating
efficiencies of publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The REIT industry
experienced explosive growth over the last fifteen years from a total market capitalization of
$8.74 billion in 1990 to $305.1 billion in 2004 (NAREIT.org). Viewed differently, the 119
REITs in 1990 averaged $73.4 million assets whereas the 190 REITs in 2004 averaged $1.6
billion in assets, a dazzling compound growth rate of 22.8 percent per year. As a consequence,
considerable interest and analysis emerged on the underpinnings and sustainability of this
sector’s growth.
Two schools of thought offer conflicting opinions on the long-term viability of projected
growth and consolidation in the REIT industry. One view argues that the real estate industry still
exhibits a cyclical pattern and that the industry cannot long sustain the current growth spurt. For
example, Vogel (1997) states that external factors drive the rapid growth of the REIT industry,
not superior operating performance. The alternative perspective argues that the full potential for
this sector remains significantly untapped and that REITs can continue to expand as low-cost
producers of investment real estate. Linneman (1997) argues that the sources of the competitive
advantage include economies of scale, lower capital costs, and superior sources of capital.
Generally, most commentators think that scale economies and the potential for gains in operating
efficiencies do exist. Considerable debate continues, however, as to the sources and the
magnitude of these efficiencies (see Anderson, Lewis, Springer, 2000, for a general review).
The literature on REIT operating efficiencies has evolved mostly along the lines of
improved estimation methods. Our analysis adds to the existing literature along a number of
dimensions. First and foremost, we provide additional methodological improvements. Whereas
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previous studies generally use cross-sectional analysis, we use a panel-data model. Specifying a
translog cost function and using 1995 to 2003 data, we estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data
model of REIT operating efficiencies that also identifies various factors that influence efficiency.
The methodology allows for different production plans or technology to exert control over the
stochastic frontier estimation as the analysis moves forward from one year to the next. That is,
the stochastic frontier and its implied technology base get updated over time as more information
becomes available.1 Also, we use two alternative output measures, total assets and revenues, and
we incorporate input costs into the model. Most previous studies consider a single output
measure and do not consider input costs. 2
Our findings differ from most prior research. When updating the cost frontier as more
information gets incorporated into the panel data model, we find little evidence of scale
economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, the consideration of input prices
and the analysis of the industry using a multi-year sample generally reveal smaller inefficiencies
than those identified in other studies. The results also show that the efficiency effects of the type
of REIT management differ according to the output measure used to calculate efficiency. When
we use revenue to measure output, self-management generally, but not always, associates with
more efficiency; but when we measure output with assets, external management uniformly
associates with more efficiency across all sample periods. Also contrary to prior research, higher
leverage associates with more efficiency. Finally, the results further suggest, in three of our four
specifications, that REIT inefficiency increases over time.
1

Viewed another way, our method rules out technological regress over time, which can occur n stochastic frontier
estimations that employ year-by-year cross-section estimation. By retaining all prior years as new data get added to
the sample, the old technology still exists in the data and will anchor the frontier, if the new year’s cross-section will
by itself exhibit technical regress.
2

This study does not perform the first panel-data study on REIT efficiency. Miller, Clauretie and Springer (2006)
use input costs, panel data, and two output measures. Our study introduces a more refined and improved
methodology that measures efficiency without holding the cost frontier constant over time.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature for both
efficiency studies, in general, and for REITs, in particular. Section III discusses the stochasticfrontier, panel-data methodology used to estimate REIT operating efficiency. Section IV reports
and interprets the results of our analysis. Section V concludes.
II.

Literature review

Cost scale and efficiency studies, using frontier techniques, comprise a substantial literature. The
application of production and cost frontier analysis to the financial services industry, however,
remains controversial. The controversy stems from, at least, two sources -- the general debate in
the empirical production analysis literature and the peculiarities of the financial firm.
Approaches to Frontier Estimation
Most reviews of frontier estimation begin with the classic paper by Farrell (1957), which
introduces the basic framework for studying and measuring inefficiency, defined as deviations of
actual from "optimum behavior." The frontier establishes the optimum benchmark against which to
calculate deviations. Various methods, using statistical and mathematical programming techniques,
exist for the construction-estimation of the relevant frontier. A general distinction emerges between
deterministic and stochastic frontiers. Deterministic frontiers by construction fix the frontier in the
relevant space and encompass all sample observations. Thus, a small subset of data supports the
frontier, making it more prone to sampling, outlier, and statistical noise problems, which may
distort the measurement of efficiency.3
Stochastic frontiers avoid some of the problems associated with deterministic frontiers by
explicitly considering the stochastic properties of the data, and distinguishing through a composite
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Van den Broek, Førsund, Hjalmarsson, and Meeusen (1980) provide much discussion and empirical evidence.
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error term between firm-specific effects, and random shocks or statistical noise. Here, the frontier
can shift from one observation to the next, being random rather than exact.
Other problems still exist, however, with the stochastic-frontier approach. First,
implementation requires the choice of an explicit functional form for the production or cost
function, the appropriateness of which raises questions. The use of a flexible functional form, such
as the translog, helps to alleviate this concern to some extent.
Second, the researcher imposes strong distributional assumptions on the error term. While
debate continues, some evidence suggests a limited effect of distributional assumptions on the
obtained estimates (e.g., Cowing, Reifschneider, and Stevenson 1983, and Greene 1990).
Moreover, the relative rankings of firms based on inefficiency calculations seem unaffected. But,
the absolute levels of inefficiencies differ over different distributional assumptions on the onesided error term, with "... the single parameter models ... providing a more pessimistic impression
than warranted." (Greene 1990, p. 158).
Frontier Studies of Real Estate Investment Trust Scale and Efficiency
Examination of REIT economies of scale predates REIT efficiency studies. Bers and Springer
(1997, 1998a,b) and Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) employ the standard approach of
estimating the cost function without allowing for the possibility of inefficient production (i.e.,
production above the efficient cost function). They all report evidence of economies of scale for
REITs.
We know of five frontier studies of REIT operating efficiency. Two papers employ data
envelopment analysis (DEA). Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) use DEA to calculate
economies of scale and inefficiency for REITs for a 1992-1996 sample. They find extremely large
inefficiencies, ranging from 45 to 60 percent. Anderson and Springer (2003) calculate REIT
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efficiency, using DEA for a 1995-1999 sample, and then use that measure as an indicator for
portfolio selection. Although not the main focus of their paper, they also report extremely large
levels of inefficiency.
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) estimate a stochastic frontier that incorporates
Bayesian statistics to calculate economies of scale and inefficiency for REITs over the 1995 to
1997 period. They report much lower levels of inefficiency than either of the DEA studies.4 Using
the Bayesian stochastic frontier methodology, they also determine on a case-by-case basis whether
inefficiency differs between REITs because of (1) management type (i.e., self or externally
managed), (2) leverage (i.e., high or low leverage), and (3) portfolio diversification (i.e.,
specialized or diversified).5 They find that self-management associates with higher efficiency in
1995 and 1996, but with lower efficiency in 1997. The 1997 finding raises some concern, since it
proves inconsistent with prior work (Bers and Springer 1998b and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and
Webb 2002). Higher leverage REITs exhibit higher inefficiency than lower leverage REITs in all
three years. Finally, REIT diversification does not affect efficiency, contrary to some of the
existing evidence (Bers and Springer 1998b and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb 2002).6
The most recent frontier study (Miller, Clauretie, and Springer, 2006) also uses the
stochastic-frontier methodology using a panel data sample from 1995 to 2003. They propose two
measures of output and develop two measures of input prices, missing from most prior studies.
They use the entire panel-data sample to estimate the stochastic frontier and calculate the
4

Since DEA frontiers encompass the entire data set while the stochastic frontier permits individual points to lie
outside the frontier, finding larger inefficiencies for DEA frontiers relative to stochastic frontiers makes intuitive
sense.
5

A dummy variable captures whether the REIT experiences external or self-management. High debt REITs hold a
debt ratio above 67 percent. Finally, a Hirschman-Herfindhal index above 80 percent identifies a focused- or nondiversified portfolio.
6

Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) also use a stochastic-frontier approach. Using data from 1990 to 2001,
they find scale economies. They consider the stochastic-frontier specification in their penultimate section. The
description of the model and its estimation prove sketchy, at best.
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economies of scale and efficiency measures. Their model implicitly assumes that the available
production plans or technology did not change over the sample period. They find some evidence
that economies of scale existed in the 1995 to 1997 period, but had disappeared by the 1998 to
2000 period. Finally, in the 2001 to 2003 period, some evidence of diseconomies of scale
emerges. Furthermore, they conclude that REITs exhibit much smaller levels of inefficiency than
previously reported in the literature.
While not uniform across studies, many measure output as total assets or by dividing total
assets into sub-categories. For the DEA studies, inputs reflect total cost or its sub-components –
interest expense, operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management fees. For
the stochastic frontier studies, only one includes input prices, which normally occurs in stochastic
frontier analysis. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) do not introduce any input prices, but only
include output in the translog cost function.7 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005)
apparently use input costs rather than input prices in their stochastic-frontier model. Miller,
Clauretie, and Springer (2006), the exception, introduce two proxies for input prices – interest
expense per dollar of debt and other expense per dollar of assets.
Our analysis differs from Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) in an important
methodological respect. They estimate one frontier for the entire 1995 to 2003 sample period,
implicitly assuming that no technological improvement occurred over time. For example, the
frontier employs 2003 information to estimate the benchmark frontier for measuring efficiency for
REITs operating in 1995.8 We only use information available each year to estimate the benchmark
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That translog cost function appears in Bers and Springer (1998a,b).

8

Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) do break their sample into three subperiods – 1995 to 1997, 1998 to 2000,
and 2001 to 2003. But, once again, they estimate the benchmark frontier for measuring inefficiency for all REITs in
each subperiod using the entire subsample. Thus, for example, the inefficiency of a REAT in 1995 uses the frontier
estimated with data from 1995 to 1997.
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frontier for that year. For example, we employ data from 1995 to 2000 to estimate the benchmark
for calculating inefficiency for REITs operating in 2000. As a result, all findings reported in Miller,
Clauretie, and Springer (2006) potentially could change when we consider different benchmark
frontiers for each year covered in our sample (i.e., 1998 to 2003).
III.

Methodology

Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) first introduce the
stochastic-frontier model, where a stochastic frontier provides an upper bound on actual
production or a lower bound on actual cost. The basic model assumes a composite error term that
sums a two-sided error term, measuring all effects outside the firm’s control, and a one-sided,
non-negative error term, measuring technical inefficiency. A firm can lie on or within the
frontier, and the distance between actual output and the frontier output represents technical
inefficiency. The early articles on stochastic frontiers used cross-section data. With panel data,
however, later models (Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and
Coelli, 1992) include time-varying inefficiency.
As alluded to above, the use of panel data opens an important question concerning what
data to employ to capture the production plans or technology available for the firms. Tulkens and
vander Eeckart (1995) offer several possible scenarios. First, the researcher can opt to use the
cross-section of firms in each year to represent the potential production plans or technology. That
approach implicitly assumes that past and future production plans or technologies do not play
any role in determining the frontier for the current time period. We call this approach the nomemory method, indicating that no information (no memory) other than the current period enters
into the calculation of the frontier. For REITs, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) implement
this method.
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At the other extreme, the researcher can use the entire panel data set to define the frontier
for each and every firm in each and every year. In this case, all existing production plans or
technologies in the panel data provide the information for specifying the frontier. Such an
approach probably makes the most sense in an industry where the production plans or technology
does not change rapidly. We call this approach the perfect forward- and backward-looking
method, indicating that all information (past, current, and future memory) enters into the
calculation of the frontier. Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) adopt this method to study
REIT efficiency
Finally, a middle ground exists whereby the current period incorporates the production
plans or technologies of the current and all past periods.9 That is, the past information on how to
organize production does not disappear from the memory of the firms in the current period. As
such, this assumption rules out technical regress, since last period’s production plans or
technology appears in this period’s information set. We call this approach the perfect backwardlooking method, indicating that all current and past information (past and current memory) enters
into the calculation of the frontier.
We adopt the perfect backward-looking method for our analysis in this paper. Thus, we
estimate the frontier cost curve in each period, say 1999, using all prior years and the current
year, that is, 1995 to 1999, in the estimation. Then we calculate the efficiency and economies of
scale only for the last year in the sample period used, that is, 1999. The calculation of efficiency
in a prior year, say 1998, comes from estimating the cost frontier using the sample period that
ends in that year, that is, 1995 to 1998. In sum we calculate the efficiencies and cost elasticities
9

Charnes, Clark, Cooper, and Golney (1985) use a special case of this third option called windows analysis. This
approach employs a fixed window size so that when the researcher moves to the next time period, the earliest time
period in the window drops out as the new time period gets added. The third approach discussed in the text employs
a variable window size that increases by one when the researcher moves to the next time period in the sample. That
is, once information enters the stock of technical knowledge, it does not disappear or depreciate as time advances.
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for REITs in 1998, 1999, …, and 2003, estimating the frontiers from data sets of 1995 to 1998,
1995 to 1999, …, and 1995-2003, respectively.
The Framework
In the present study, we view the REIT firm as an intermediary, operating in competitive markets
and using a multiple input-output technology. The concept of efficiency (and, thus, inefficiency),
although well rooted in the history of economic thought, possesses a normative character, which is
reinforced by the short list of inputs normally considered in empirical models.10 Our interpretation
accords with the widely held view of production as a systematic technical relationship of inputs
and outputs, and with the observation that firms can survive in markets for extended periods, even
though they appear to operate at relatively lower levels of efficiency.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We specify and estimate a composite-error model. This
model separates firm-specific effects, captured by the one-sided error term (uit), from random
shocks and statistical noise, reflected by the two-sided, symmetric error term (vit), and permits the
estimation of firm-specific deviations, using the method of Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt
(1982). We also evaluate the role of some other firm-specific factors that may affect the level of
inefficiency by specifying the one-sided error term as depending on these additional control
variables (Battese and Coelli 1995; Coelli 1996).
The Model
We estimate a translog variable cost function with a composite error term (εit) that can be written as
follows (we drop REIT and time subscripts to simplify):
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Stigler (1976) discusses these issues with some insightful observations.
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m

n

i =1

j =1

m

m

ln C = α 0 + ∑ α i ln qi + ∑ β j ln( 1 + p j ) + ∑∑ π ir ln qi ln qr
(1)

n

n

i =1 r =1

m

n

+ ∑∑ δ jk ln( 1 + p j )ln( 1 + pk ) + ∑∑ φij ln qi ln( 1 + p j ) + ε ,
j =1 k =1

i =1 j =1

where lnC = the natural logarithm of the cost; lnqi = the natural logarithm of the ith output
(i=1,...,m); ln(1+pj) = the natural logarithm of one plus the jth input price (j=1,...,n); ε = v + u with
v ≈ N(0, σ2v) and u ≈ N(m, σ2u), a truncated normal; m = θ 0 +

q

∑ θ s x s + w ; xs = alternative control

s =1

variables; w = a two-sided, symmetric random error ≈ N(0, σ2w); and α, ß, π, δ, φ, and θ equal
coefficients. Since a few observations for pj equal zero, we took the natural logarithm of (1 + pj) so
as to not lose those observations.
The technical efficiency index for each firm in the sample is given as follows (Battese and
Coelli 1995; and Coelli 1996):
q

TE = exp( u ) = exp( θ 0 + ∑ θ s xs + w ) .

(2)

s =1

We adopt the translog cost function for two basic reasons. First, it imposes virtually no
restrictions on the first- and second-order effects. At the same time, it also provides a second-order
logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary continuous transformation surface.11 Second, the dual
approach, although not free of problems itself, allows the bypassing of the well-known problems of
multicollinearity that inherently plagues the direct approach. The reliability of our results hinges, of
course, on the validity of the cost-minimization assumption.

The Data
11

Previous research on the cost structure of commercial banks concludes in favor of our specification. For example,
Lawrence (1989) rejects both the more-restrictive Cobb-Douglas specification and the more-flexible Box-Cox
transformation in favor of the translog. Also, Noulas, Ray, and Miller (1990a), using Call Report data for large banks,
conclude against homotheticity, constant returns to scale, and so on, while Noulas, Miller, and Ray (1993) demonstrate
the instability of the findings from alternative Box-Cox transformations.
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Our data include 1995 to 2003 information on publicly traded REITs listed in the National

Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Handbook and the SNL REIT DataSource.
Due to missing values, the final sample consists of 212, 221, 222, 236, 233, 220, 208, 198, and 132
REITs in 1995, 1996, …, and 2003, respectively, for a total of 1851 observations.12 Table 1 reports
summary statistics.
Prior research has favored the use of total assets as the measure of REIT output. Lewis,
Springer, and Anderson (2003) use total assets and market capitalization (i.e., share price times the
number of shares) as alternative measures of output and conclude that total assets perform the best.
Following Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006), we use two alternative aggregate measures of
output (q), total assets and total revenue. That is, the translog cost function includes only one
output, but we estimate two separate specifications, one for total assets and one for total revenue.
Prior research (Bers and Springer 1998a,b; Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 2003) does
not incorporate input prices.13 While the data source puts a severe constraint on generating input
prices, Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) construct two proxies for input prices. We adopt
their approach, calculating the input prices as follows: the average interest cost per dollar of debt
(average price of debt, i) and the average other expenses per dollar of assets (average price of
other inputs, r). The dependent variable for the translog panel model is total cost (C), which
includes (1) interest expense, (2) operating expense, (3) general and administrative expense, and
(4) management fees.
The stochastic cost function includes one output and two input prices. We also introduce
one control variable to control for different levels of debt. More specifically, we include the debt-
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In addition to missing values, we deleted all observations with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding one.
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Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) apparently use input costs, not input prices, in their stochastic-frontier
model estimation.
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to-asset ratio, Debt-Ratio, as a continuous variable that effectively shifts the cost frontier.
Generally, a more leveraged REIT should face higher costs because the debt-service cost is higher.
Moreover, REITs do not garner any tax shield effect because the interest expense offers no tax
advantage.
The prior discussion focuses on the specification of the frontier cost function. That is, what
cost frontier associates with a 100-perfcent efficient REIT, given the available technology. The
estimation technique of the stochastic frontier includes a one-sided error term that captures
inefficiency deviations above the stochastic cost frontier. We also consider those variables that
may affect the inefficiency of each REIT.
First, we introduce the Debt-Ratio as such a variable. This variable decides whether higherdebt REITs show different efficiency levels in comparison to lower-debt REITs.14 More leverage
may associate with more efficiency, however, because management may monitor more closely the
activities of outsiders, specifically creditors.
Next, we include a dummy variable, Self-Managed, that equals one, if the REIT is selfmanaged. This variable determines whether self-managed REITs prove more cost efficient than
externally managed REITs. Self-managed REITs use internal staff to make investment and
managerial decisions. Externally managed REITs hire outside advisory firms to make these
decisions. Potential agency problems arise from a misalignment of incentives caused by the
compensation structure when a REIT uses an outside advisor (Sagalyn 1996). Capozza and
Seguin (2000) document that most external advisors receive compensation based on a percentage
of assets and/or property-level cash flows. They demonstrate that externally managed REITs
underperform internally managed (self-managed) REITs. Because the outside advisor typically

14

Remember that we also allow total cost to adjust due to differences in leverage.
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benefits by having more properties, externally advised REITs generally experience higher
leverage. Capozza and Seguin (2000) note that when external advisors receive compensation as a
percentage of assets or cash flow, they possess little incentive to negotiate favorable terms on the
debt, because interest expenses probably do not affect their compensation. A primary source of
the underperformance of externally managed REITs relates to the use of debt with above market
interest rates.15
Finally, we add a variable to explain changes in efficiency over time. The time variable
(i.e., Time = 1, 2, …, and 9, corresponding to 1995, 1996, …, and 2003, respectively) measures
whether REITs became more or less cost efficient over the sample period. For example, the rapid
growth in the size of the average REIT, mentioned in the introduction, may cause inefficiency to
rise as managers find it difficult to accommodate rapid growth efficiently.
IV.

Results

Tables 2 through 7 present the estimated cost frontiers, using panel data sets 1995 to 1998, 1995 to
1999, …, and 1995 to 2003, respectively, for output defined as total assets and total revenue. We
report results for specifications without (simple model) and with (complex model) input prices.
The precise estimating equations emerge from equations (1) and (2) as follows:
(3)

ln Cost = α 01 + α11 ⋅ ln Asset + π 111 ⋅ ln Asset ⋅ ln Asset
+ γ 11 ⋅ Debt -Ratio + v1 + u1 ;

ln Cost = α 02 + α12 ⋅ ln Asset + π 112 ⋅ ln Asset ⋅ ln Asset + β12 ⋅ ln( 1 + i )
(4)

+ δ112 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + β 22 ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) + δ 222 ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) ⋅ ln( 1 + r )
+ φ122 ⋅ ln Asset ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + φ132 ⋅ ln Asset ⋅ ln( 1 + r )
+ φ232 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) + γ 12 ⋅ Debt -Ratio + v 2 + u 2 ;
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Also, Ambrose and Linneman (2001) note that externally advised REITs have altered their operating
characteristics, such as debt use, to become more competitive with self-managed REITs.
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(5)

ln Cost = α 03 + α13 ⋅ ln Revenue + π 113 ⋅ ln Revenue ⋅ ln Revenue
+ γ 13 Debt -Ratio + v 3 + u 3 ;

ln Cost = α 04 + α14 ⋅ ln Re venue + π 114 ⋅ ln Re venue ⋅ ln Re venue
+ β14 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + δ114 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + β 24 ⋅ ln( 1 + r )
+ δ 224 ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) + φ124 ⋅ ln Re venue ⋅ ln( 1 + i )

(6)

+ φ134 ⋅ ln Re venue ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) + φ234 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) ⋅ ln( 1 + r )
+ γ 14 ⋅ Debt -Ratio + v 4 + u 4 ;
(7)

TE i = exp( u i ) = exp( θ 0i + θ1i ⋅ Time + θ 2i ⋅ Self -Managed
+ θ3i ⋅ Debt -Ratio + wi ), where i = 1 to 4.

We link the appropriate error specifications in equation (7) to their counterparts in equations (3),
(4), (5), and (6) and perform a stochastic frontier estimation.
Given our approach of the perfect backward-looking method, we report estimated models
for each year from 1998 to 2003. A comparison of the coefficients over time permits us to
determine whether cost technology improves. More specifically, adding a year to the sample can
alter coefficients in two ways. First, if cost technology improves, then the frontier shifts downward,
lowering cost for a given level of output. In this case, the coefficients that define the cost frontier
must change from year to year. On the other hand, if cost technology does not improve, the frontier
does not shift and the coefficients that define the frontier should not change from year to year.
Second, the coefficients that define how inefficiency responds to its determinants may also adjust.
In this case, we argue that such shifts imply a fragile, non-robust relationship.

Shifting Cost Frontiers
First, we address the question of whether the cost technology improves over the sample period. In
testing for significant differences in the same coefficients between two consecutive models, we
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find limited evidence of technological shifts. For example, testing for differences between the
coefficients that define the cost frontier in Tables 6 and 7 will determine whether the frontier
shifted between 2002 and 2003.
No evidence exists of a cost frontier shift between consecutive years with the exception of
1998 and 1999. In this case, the results suggest a frontier shift for both the simple and the complex
specifications when revenue measures output and for the complex specification only when assets
measure output. For 1998 and 1999, although the coefficient of the debt ratio does not change
significantly, nearly every other coefficient experiences a significant adjustment. For all other
years, no evidence emerges to indicate that the frontier shifts because of improved technology. In
all specifications, the debt ratio associates positively with the total cost. That is, as expected, a
higher debt ratio raises the REIT’s frontier cost of operation.
We searched for regulatory or structural changes as possible explanations for the shift in
the frontier between 1998 and 1999. But no compelling story emerges. First, the REIT
Simplification Act of 1997 became effective in 1998. This Act implemented a number of tax-law
changes, but no one of them should exhibit dramatic effects. Second, analysts refer to the 1992 to
2001 as the REIT modernization era. In both cases, we see numerous small changes. The
cumulative effect of these small changes could precipitate a one-time shift in the cost frontier, once
a threshold is crossed. At the moment, however, our argument proves highly speculative.

Inefficiency Model
Next, we consider the inefficiency model. The estimate of gamma provides a test of whether a
frontier model makes sense in the first place. We note that gamma proves insignificant at the 5percent level for the complex specification with output measured by assets in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 7.
Moreover, even when it is significant, gamma exhibits an extremely small value for this model

16

relative to the other specifications. Finally, the coefficients of the explanatory variables generally
prove insignificant for this specification. In sum, this specification may imply no inefficiency in
the REIT industry over the 1998 to 2003 sample period. Thus, we largely ignore further comments
on the complex specification of the inefficiency model using total assets as the output measure.
To interpret the constant and the coefficients in the inefficiency specification, consider the
simple model with output defined as assets and the estimates reported in Table 7. The constant in
the estimation of the mean of the one-sided inefficiency term equals –1.6301. Since we estimate
the mean of the truncated normal distribution function that captures the inefficiency, a negative
mean implies that the normal distribution locates to the left of the origin. The distribution truncates
the negative values, leaving only the right-side tail of the distribution. Now, consider the
coefficient of self-management of 0.5978. For self-managed REITs, the self-management variable
equals 1 and the new mean of the truncated normal distribution equals –1.0323 (= –1.6301 +
0.5978). Thus, the distribution shifts to the right and the size of the truncated tail used to calculate
the inefficiency becomes larger, implying that inefficiency rises. In sum, self-managed REITs
generate more inefficiency in the specification closest to the Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003)
model. They find that self-management reduces inefficiency in 1995 and 1996, but increases
inefficiency in 1997. The estimates in Table 7 consider the period from 1995 to 2003 and shows
that for this specification self-management increases inefficiency, on average.16
For all specifications with a significant gamma, the debt ratio shows a significant and
negative effect on inefficiency in all sample periods, save one. That is, a higher debt ratio generally
associates with higher efficiency. This finding matches the results of Miller, Clauretie, and
Springer (2006), but counters those of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) from their Bayesian

16

For the simple specification with output measured by assets, all estimates of the coefficient of the self-managed
dummy variable produce a significant and positive value.
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stochastic frontier specification.17 More specifically, we find a significant effect whereby REITs
using more leverage operate on a higher cost frontier. But, given this finding, higher leverage
REITs must exercise much more care in their operations, achieving higher efficiency than their
lower-leveraged colleagues. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) do not use the debt-to-asset
ratio to shift their cost frontier. Thus, the effect of the debt-to-asset ratio on the cost function
dominates its effect on improving efficiency, probably leading to their conclusion that a high debtto-asset ratio REIT exhibits more inefficiency (less efficiency).
The remaining two explanatory variables – time and self-management – show different
outcomes over time and across specifications. Self-managed REITs exhibit higher inefficiency in
the simple model with output measured by assets across all time periods. Self-managed REITs
generally exhibit lower inefficiency in both models with output measured by revenue, except in
1999 and 2000 (Tables 3 and 4). The former finding proves consistent with the results of Bers and
Springer (1998b) and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002). The latter proves consistent
with Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). Because REITs report assets on a cost basis,
measuring output with assets does not capture managerial efforts to enhance asset value.
Moreover, revenue correlates more directly with value. Thus, in this instance, measuring output
with revenue may better reflect the managerial goal of maximizing shareholder value.
Finally, for the simple specifications, time reduces inefficiency in 1998 and 1999 (Tables 2
and 3), but increases inefficiency in 2000 through 2003 (Tables 4 through 7). For the complex
specification with output measured by revenue, inefficiency consistently increases with time across
all years. The bulk of the evidence suggests that REITs become more inefficient over time. We
17

We do not consider the portfolio diversification variable. But, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) find that this
variable does not generate a consistent effect on REIT inefficiency. Also, a key difference exists between our findings
and those of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). They consider the effects of self-management, the debt ratio, and
portfolio diversification on a case-by-case basis. We include all control variables simultaneously. Further, our
specification of the frontier cost function includes the debt-to-asset ratio as a shift variable.
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initially anticipated that REITs would improve their efficiency over time, since improved methods
of operation should lower cost. It seems unlikely that REITs become less efficient over time
without some external stimulus. The rapid growth in the size of REITs over the past 15 years may
explain this increase in inefficiency. Perhaps, management could not keep up with the growth.
Also, in an expanding REIT industry, the transactions costs of growth may distort the expense
measurement relative to the expenses of operating a relatively stabilized property portfolio. Also,
changes in the regulatory environment may have contributed to increased inefficiency.18

Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
The model estimates permit the calculation of economies of scale. The measure of economies of
scale equals the cost elasticity with respect to output – either assets or revenue. That is, the cost
elasticity with respect to output equals the partial derivative of the logarithmic cost functions in
equations (3), (4), (5), and (6) with respect to the logarithm of output. For example, the cost
elasticity with respect to output in equation (4) where assets measure output equals the following
relation:
(8)

∂ ln Cost
= α12 + 2 ⋅ π 112 ⋅ ln Assets + φ122 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + φ132 ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) .
∂ ln Assets

Using the coefficients from Table 7, we get the exact calculation as follows:
(9)

∂ ln Cost
= 1.0166 + 2 ⋅ 0.0005 ⋅ ln Assets − 0.1027 ⋅ ln( 1 + i ) + 0.0129 ⋅ ln( 1 + r ) ,
∂ ln Assets

where we need to include values for lnAssets, ln(1+i), and ln(1+r) for each REIT and each time
period. Table 8 reports the average cost elasticity with respect to output. We calculate the cost
elasticity for each REIT in the final year of the sample period used to estimate the cost frontier. For

18

In discussing the possible explanations for the significant shift in the frontier between 1998 and 1999, we
discussed the REIT Simplification Act of 1997, which altered many tax laws. The REIT Modernization Act of 1999,
became effective in 2001.
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example, we estimate the average cost elasticity for REITs in 2002 using the frontier estimated
from the 1995 to 2002 sample period.
Except for the specification in equation (4), the cost elasticity does not differ significantly
from one implying trivial, if any, economies or diseconomies of scale. The specification in
equation (4) suggests that diseconomies of scale exist, since the cost elasticity significantly exceeds
one in 2001, 2002, and 2003, but does not significantly differ from one in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) report economies (increasing returns) to scale for 1995,
1996, and 1997, using assets as the measure of output. Bers and Springer (1997, 1998a,b) and
Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) also report economies of scale for samples of REITs in
the 1990s. The limited evidence for diseconomies of scale diminishes when we use revenue as
output or when we exclude the input price control variables.19 Our findings prove generally
consistent with those of Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006).
Inefficiency Estimates
Table 9 reports the inefficiency estimates from our various specifications and sample periods. As
before, we calculate the inefficiency for each REIT in the final year of the sample period used to
estimate the cost frontier. For example, we calculate the inefficiency for REITs in 2000 relative to
the frontier estimated from the 1995 to 2000 sample period.
The lowest inefficiency emerges for the complex specification with output measured by
assets. But, this specification also shows an extremely small and frequently insignificant gamma
value, implying that the frontier approach did not apply. In other words, a small and insignificant
gamma suggests that inefficiency does not exist, corresponding to the small estimates of
inefficiency. The simple specification with output measured by assets exhibits the most

19

Bers and Springer (1997) do find that the number of REITs exhibiting economies of scale diminishes with the
inclusion of other control variables
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inefficiency of about 100 percent on average over the 1998 to 2003 period.20 The specifications
with output measured by revenue generate average inefficiencies of around 20 and 15 percent for
the simple and complex specifications, respectively. Our inefficiency estimates generally prove
consistent with Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) and are generally smaller than those of
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003), who report dramatic reductions in inefficiency estimates
when using the Bayesian stochastic frontier specification rather than DEA.
V.

Conclusions

The results show that the estimated returns to scale for publicly traded REITs do not support
economies of scale. That is, our findings suggest no scale economies, but provide some evidence
for diseconomies of scale. Previous studies generally find economies of scale. Those studies use
older data and cross-section analysis. Our panel-data model extends the coverage through 2003.
The rapid growth in the size of REITs may have exhausted the economies of scale for all but the
smaller firms in the industry. That is, given the dramatic growth in average REIT size over the
sample period, the movement from no economies of scale early in the sample period to
diseconomies of scale at the end of the sample period makes intuitive sense.
Consistent with the findings of many prior studies, Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006)
identify possible economies of scale during the 1995 to 1997 period. Their methodology applies
the same frontier to all REITs in the sample period. That is, when they estimate the model using
the 1995 to 1997 sample period, they calculate the cost elasticity estimate for all REITs in the
three-year period. This paper uses the panel data set, say 1995 to 1998, to estimate the frontier,
assuming the perfect backward-looking method. Then we use the estimated frontier to determine
the cost elasticity only for those REITs in the most recent year, in this case 1998. As such, we find

20

Note that 100-percent inefficiency means that the actual cost doubles the minimum cost of that output. Thus, over
100-percent inefficiency in cost proves feasible.
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no evidence of economies of scale, but we begin our examination only in 1998, by which time
Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) conclude that economies of scale no longer exist in the
industry. Thus, our current findings do not convey a different story from those of Miller, Clauretie,
and Springer (2006).
The initial tests of REIT efficiency using DEA report large inefficiencies (Anderson,
Springer, Fok, and Webb, 2002; Anderson and Springer, 2003). Lewis, Springer, and Anderson
(2003) use a stochastic frontier and find much lower levels of inefficiency than either of the DEA
studies. This study generally documents even lower inefficiencies. But, we also find that
inefficiencies increase over time, consistent with the findings of Miller, Clauretie, and Springer
(2006).
The finding that a higher debt-to-asset ratio associates with more efficiency runs counter to
the findings of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). Unlike Lewis, Springer, and Anderson
(2003), we employ the debt-to-asset ratio to shift the frontier cost function as well as to explain the
one-sided (inefficiency) error term. We find that higher leverage raises the cost frontier and lowers
inefficiency. Jensen (1986) argues that higher leverage can induce less efficiency through agency
problems between managers and owners or more efficiency due to more intense external
monitoring. Our results conform to that latter view.
Our results also offer some apparent contradictions to conventional wisdom as well as
further insight into the REIT industry’s rapid growth. Conventional wisdom and most prior
research suggest that self-managed REITs exhibit more efficiency than the alternatives, namely
affiliate- or third-party managed REITs. Our results indicate different outcomes depending on the
measure of output. When we measure output with assets, self-management associates with more
inefficiency. Capozza and Seguin (2000) note that external advisers frequently receive
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compensation tied to assets. This may explain why external advisers prove more efficient when
assets measure output. When we measure output with revenue, self-management exhibits more
efficiency, the opposite outcome. We propose that revenue better captures the goal of internal
managers to maximize shareholder value. Thus, managers expend much effort to wring additional
revenue out of their firm with much less concern about firm size, as measured by assets. In sum,
we argue that the contradictory results on the effect of the self-management dummy variable
supports the use of revenue over assets as a measure of output in REIT economies-of-scale and
efficiency studies.
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Table 1:

Summary Statistics

Variable

Average

Median

lnCost
lnAssets
lnRevenue
ln(1+i)
ln(1+r)
Time
Self-Managed
Debt-Ratio

11.0783
13.2183
11.3127
0.0653
0.1051
4.7942
0.7758
0.4941

11.2330
13.4453
11.5140
0.0631
0.0784
5.0000
1.0000
0.4881

Note:

Maximum Minimum

15.9116
17.0662
15.9870
1.0756
1.7815
9.0000
1.0000
0.9964

2.6391
7.2779
2.0794
0.0000
0.0012
1.0000
0.0000
0.0031

The symbol ln stands for the natural logarithm. Cost includes interest expense,
operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management fees
interest cost on all deposits. Assets equals total assets. Revenue equals total
revenue. We calculate the input prices as follows: i equals the average interest cost
per dollar of debt and r equals the average other expenses per dollar of assets.
Time runs from 1 to 9 capturing 1995 to 2003. Self-Managed equals one for selfmanaged REITs; 0 otherwise. Debt-Ratio equals the ratio of total debt to total
assets.
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Table 2:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 1998

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
-0.4742
-0.55
Constant_1
0.5560*
4.11
lnAsset
0.0156*
2.87
lnAsset*lnAsset
ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0906* 18.15
Debt-Ratio
-1.0823
-1.34
Constant_2
-0.3919* -4.55
Time
1.2119** 2.21
Self-Managed
-10.4725* -23.27
Debt-Ratio
2.3247*
7.42
Sigma-Squared
0.9321* 85.34
Gamma

Coefficient
-6.2649*
1.2764*
-0.0074
24.2147*
-13.9607*
11.9710*
-6.4275*
-0.6003*
-0.0336
-10.7590*
0.8340*
-0.0079
-0.0116
0.0890*
-0.0087
0.0390*
0.0013

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

t-ratio Variable
-7.53 Constant_1
9.74 lnRevenue
-1.44 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
24.41 ln(1+i)
-14.05 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
12.55 ln(1+p)
-9.26 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
-11.96 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
-0.85 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
-10.88 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
14.26 Debt-Ratio
-0.39 Constant_2
-1.37 Time
9.04 Self-Managed
-0.79 Debt-Ratio
19.73 Sigma-Squared
1.18 Gamma

Coefficient
0.3250
0.7654*
0.0106*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
1.08 -1.2189* -4.13
13.67 0.9887* 18.62
4.01
0.0023
0.92
7.6817*
4.49
-3.4289* -2.96
5.3002*
8.97
-2.2816* -9.44
-0.2781* -3.51
-0.0869* -3.58
-2.3575* -3.11
1.0940* 18.41 0.7195* 17.95
-0.4187
-0.98 -5.0797* -2.77
-0.2084* -3.44 0.4275** 2.09
-0.5505** -2.54 -0.5459* -2.70
-4.3627* -4.06 -1.3065* -4.61
0.5866*
3.49
0.6388*
3.70
0.9186* 39.56 0.9500* 70.68

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

*
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.;
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 3:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 1999

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

Variable
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable
-0.0182
-0.02 -3.2939* -6.31 Constant_1
Constant_1
0.4729*
3.81
0.9371* 14.65 lnRevenue
lnAsset
0.0193*
3.97
0.0018
0.55 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
lnAsset*lnAsset
2.9972*
3.06 ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)
-5.7794* -5.83 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
6.8453*
6.94 ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)
-3.2301* -52.95 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
0.1578*
2.81 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
0.0499
1.35 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
-2.0131** -2.04 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0387* 19.94 0.9461* 15.83 Debt-Ratio
Debt-Ratio
-1.8987* -3.76
-0.0186
-0.63 Constant_2
Constant_2
0.1389
1.78
-0.0048
-1.56 Time
Time
1.3548*
3.75 0.1100** 2.39 Self-Managed
Self-Managed
-10.5132* -10.24 -0.0444
-0.71 Debt-Ratio
Debt-Ratio
2.2436*
6.42
0.0528* 28.03 Sigma-Squared
Sigma-Squared
0.9286* 65.34 0.0068*
0.86 Gamma
Gamma

Coefficient
1.2743*
0.6050*
0.0178*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
5.54
-0.1934
-0.83
14.66 0.8471* 19.94
9.28
0.0071*
3.53
1.7027
1.55
-1.5433** -1.98
3.5849*
8.31
-1.0245* -7.72
-0.0237
-0.42
-0.0614* -3.25
0.3151
0.43
0.9491* 21.24 0.7635* 17.89
-3.0645* -2.61 -4.6126* -4.09
-0.2638* -5.20 0.2518*
4.14
-0.2200
-0.54
0.0379
0.50
-3.2843* -4.58 -1.5865* -6.10
0.9053*
4.86
0.5457*
4.70
0.9545* 99.13 0.9390* 72.60

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

**
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 4:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2000

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
-0.2806
-0.44
Constant_1
0.5056*
4.91
lnAsset
0.0183*
4.45
lnAsset*lnAsset
ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0413* 19.75
Debt-Ratio
-2.1866* -3.92
Constant_2
0.2903*
6.17
Time
1.5030*
8.93
Self-Managed
-10.2811* -26.81
Debt-Ratio
2.1761* 11.31
Sigma-Squared
0.9292* 141.01
Gamma

Coefficient
-3.6917*
0.9888*
0.0003
4.8582*
-5.3034*
7.3886*
-3.0603*
0.0822**
0.0231
-2.8554*
0.9527*
-0.0250
-0.0043
0.1266*
-0.0603
0.0466*
0.0063

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

t-ratio Variable
-9.16 Constant_1
16.38 lnRevenue
0.13 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
4.99 ln(1+i)
-7.45 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
11.86 ln(1+p)
-35.86 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
2.25 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
1.01 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
-4.48 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
60.29 Debt-Ratio
-0.48 Constant_2
-0.78 Time
6.68 Self-Managed
-0.98 Debt-Ratio
18.46 Sigma-Squared
0.14 Gamma

Coefficient
1.1746*
0.6191*
0.0171*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
31.71 0.5864*
3.03
34.18 0.7262* 20.91
16.27 0.0116*
7.08
-1.1394
-1.08
-0.9609
-1.46
3.6376* 10.97
-0.8204* -7.64
0.1047** 2.00
-0.0710* -4.82
-0.0605
-0.11
1.0117* 27.44 0.7767* 35.36
-1.7772
-1.43 -5.2823* -10.32
-0.0581
-0.92 0.1551* 12.59
0.0632
0.34
0.5522*
7.00
-4.6382** -2.46 -0.9152* -6.94
0.7044*
2.71
0.5659* 12.59
0.9469* 81.58 0.9432* 202.29

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

*
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 5:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2001

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
-0.7477
-1.12
Constant_1
0.5717*
5.58
lnAsset
0.0160*
4.04
lnAsset*lnAsset
ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0549* 23.46
Debt-Ratio
-2.1741* -4.64
Constant_2
0.3572*
8.92
Time
1.2663*
4.26
Self-Managed
-10.4681* -13.43
Debt-Ratio
2.1957* 10.28
Sigma-Squared
0.9324* 100.13
Gamma

Coefficient
-3.6350*
0.9629*
0.0018
7.4872*
-4.9699*
7.3628*
-2.9385*
-0.0175
0.0178
-3.9826*
1.0173*
0.0386**
-0.0017
0.1083*
-0.1438*
0.0469*
0.0025*

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

t-ratio Variable
-11.60 Constant_1
20.76 lnRevenue
1.02 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
7.52 ln(1+i)
-16.37 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
17.55 ln(1+p)
-39.47 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
-0.44 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
1.13 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
-10.26 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
27.75 Debt-Ratio
2.02 Constant_2
-0.76 Time
6.34 Self-Managed
-4.15 Debt-Ratio
30.04 Sigma-Squared
3.27 Gamma

Coefficient
0.9870*
0.6582*
0.0153*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
4.77
0.3580
1.63
17.65 0.7640* 19.94
8.92
0.0104*
6.08
0.3319
0.32
-0.9809* -3.13
3.6432* 10.88
-0.8179* -8.02
0.0364
0.73
-0.0725* -4.85
-0.1016
-0.27
0.9883* 22.18 0.7245* 19.60
-2.8946* -4.47 -6.0659* -7.26
0.2209*
6.14
0.3434*
8.97
-0.1681* -2.76 -0.2732* -5.04
-4.5812* -7.10
-0.2485
-1.32
0.7760*
6.30
0.6033*
9.06
0.9546* 129.93 0.9501* 121.82

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

*
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 6:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2002

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
-1.0151
-1.56
Constant_1
0.6098*
6.10
lnAsset
0.0148*
3.81
lnAsset*lnAsset
ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0383* 25.17
Debt-Ratio
-2.0624* -7.11
Constant_2
0.3171* 13.94
Time
0.8268*
4.14
Self-Managed
-11.4805* -16.48
Debt-Ratio
2.5368* 10.02
Sigma-Squared
0.9370* 111.35
Gamma

Coefficient
-4.1548*
1.0256*
0.0001
9.7692*
-5.2861*
7.8270*
-2.9764*
-0.0889**
0.0039
-4.6265*
0.9160*
-0.0697**
-0.0041
0.2047*
-0.0824*
0.0525*
0.0086*

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

t-ratio Variable
-13.77 Constant_1
22.80 lnRevenue
0.08 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
9.88 ln(1+i)
-16.43 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
18.86 ln(1+p)
-39.57 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
-2.26 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
0.25 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
-11.75 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
25.92 Debt-Ratio
-2.10 Constant_2
-1.39 Time
6.24 Self-Managed
-2.76 Debt-Ratio
27.93 Sigma-Squared
2.63 Gamma

Coefficient
0.7803*
0.6936*
0.0138*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
4.88
0.4446*
3.62
23.18 0.7491* 31.97
9.84
0.0109*
9.67
-0.5412
-0.56
-0.9795* -3.07
4.0188* 12.39
-0.7419* -7.61
0.0746
1.57
-0.0911* -6.34
-0.1013
-0.26
0.9666* 23.69 0.7543* 19.74
-3.2694* -5.40 -2.7253* -9.96
0.2251* 12.11 0.2624* 12.70
-0.8689* -4.73 -0.6999* -10.17
-4.3014* -12.05 -1.8409* -10.26
0.9535*
8.30
0.3801* 13.89
0.9648* 198.84 0.9204* 108.83

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

*
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 7:

Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2003

Asset Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
-1.1090
-1.54
Constant_1
0.6217*
5.63
lnAsset
0.0143*
3.33
lnAsset*lnAsset
ln(1+i)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
ln(1+p)
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
lnAsset*ln(1+i)
lnAsset*ln(1+p)
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
2.0825* 29.41
Debt-Ratio
-1.6301* -5.27
Constant_2
0.2886* 13.47
Time
0.5978*
3.59
Self-Managed
-11.5772* -34.08
Debt-Ratio
2.4366* 16.49
Sigma-Squared
0.9368* 173.46
Gamma

Coefficient
-4.0884*
1.0166*
0.0005
10.1945*
-5.3714*
7.5172*
-2.9532*
-0.1027*
0.0129
-4.6010*
0.9097*
0.0148
-0.0055*
0.1068*
-0.0716*
0.0509*
0.0019

Revenue Equals Output
Simple Model
Complex Model

t-ratio Variable
-15.52 Constant_1
26.88 lnRevenue
0.39 lnRevenue*lnRevenue
10.37 ln(1+i)
-17.22 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)
19.29 ln(1+p)
-42.84 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)
-2.62 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)
0.88 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)
-13.30 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)
32.54 Debt-Ratio
0.56 Constant_2
-5.70 Time
2.68 Self-Managed
-4.41 Debt-Ratio
30.10 Sigma-Squared
1.80 Gamma

Coefficient
0.7428*
0.6981*
0.0136*

t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
5.39
0.5517*
3.30
28.89 0.7324* 24.95
12.31 0.0117*
8.81
-0.7977
-0.82
-0.8953* -2.83
3.9660* 12.53
-0.7443* -8.09
0.0805
1.75
-0.0916* -6.61
0.0327
0.09
0.9819* 30.13 0.7344* 23.90
-2.3940* -4.49 -2.8996* -8.17
0.1490*
5.07
0.2006* 10.92
-0.7536* -10.19 -0.8617* -10.83
-4.9426* -20.58 -1.8687* -8.87
0.8796*
8.02
0.4430* 10.63
0.9621* 197.33 0.9332* 130.70

Note:

See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7).

*
**

significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.
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Table 8:

Average Economies of Scale

Assets
Simple
Complex

Revenue
Simple
Complex

1998 (236)
1999 (233)
2000 (220)
2001 (208)
2002 (198)
2003 (132)

0.9723
0.9892
0.9991
1.0039
1.0119
1.0288

1.0426
1.0013
1.0054
1.0124**
1.0234*
1.0266*

1.0060
1.0142
1.0176
1.0159
1.0161
1.0362

1.0173
1.0020
0.9957
1.0018
0.9976
1.0166

Total (1,227)

0.9982

1.0181

1.0162

1.0046

Year

Note:

The numbers report the average economies of scale measure for REITs in
each year based on Assets and Revenue as output and using the simple (no
input prices included in the translog specification) and complex (including
input prices models in the translog specification). Total measures the average
across all six years. Numbers in parentheses equal the number of REITs.

*

means significantly different from one at the 1-percent level in a twotailed test.
means significantly different from one at the 5-percent level in a twotailed test.

**
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Table 9:

Average Efficiency

Assets
Simple
Complex

Revenue
Simple
Complex

1998 (236)
1999 (233)
2000 (220)
2001 (208)
2002 (198)
2003 (132)

1.6836
2.1885
2.1751
2.0271
1.8363
2.2358

1.0240
1.0367
1.0366
1.0485
1.0478
1.0317

1.1669
1.1680
1.1802
1.2644
1.2938
1.2005

1.1512
1.1353
1.1318
1.1713
1.1805
1.1331

Total (1,227)

2.0099

1.0375

1.2102

1.1509

Year

Note:

The numbers report the average efficiency measure for REITs in each year
based on Assets and Revenue as output and using the simple (no input
prices included in the translog specification) and complex (including input
prices models in the translog specification). Total measures the average
across all six years. Numbers in parentheses equal the number of REITs.
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